





NEUTRAL IN NAME: ROTHE, THE ERROR OF 
ANTICLASSIFICATION, AND THE STATE OF RACE-
NEUTRAL MEANS 
William Sharon1 
This Note discusses the language state-actors use to 
create affirmative action programs, and the methods courts 
employ to determine their constitutionality.  It describes the 
context and history of affirmative action jurisprudence, and 
explains the anticlassification method, the antisubordination 
method, and the former’s influence on the current tiered 
approach. 
This Note then discusses a 2016 D.C. Circuit decision, 
Rothe v. United States Department of Defense, where the 
court of appeals held that a statutory preference awarded to 
people “who ha[ve] been subjected to racial or ethnic 
prejudice” does not contain a racial classification.  In so 
ruling, the court illustrated one reason why the 
anticlassification approach to affirmative action 
jurisprudence is untenable.  While anticlassification is 
already an antiquated method of interpretation, this Note 
contends that, in light of Rothe, it is an unworkable one as 
well.  
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In the late 1970’s, equal protection law faced a new 
challenge.2  With affirmative action in its nascent stage, the 
Supreme Court considered whether to subject programs 
intended to benefit historically subjugated racial groups to 
the same suspicion it reserved for laws designed to oppress 
minorities.3  The Court opted for this heightened scrutiny.4  
Since then, many affirmative action programs have failed to 
clear this hurdle.5  But state actors seeing the value of 
                                                 
2  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3  Id. at 290. 
4  Id. 
5  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); id. 
No. 4:175]          NEUTRAL IN NAME 177 
affirmative action have continued to strive for methods 
acceptable under this form of equal protection analysis.6 
On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court held that the 
University of Texas at Austin’s partially race-based 
admissions program did not violate the equal protection 
rights of a white person whose application the University 
denied.7  This was the second time the Court encountered the 
case, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, and the result 
was a victory for affirmative action.8  In the wake of Fisher, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered 
another case involving the issue of racial preferences.9  The 
case, Rothe v. United States Department of Defense, 
concerned a law allowing the Small Business Administration 
(“SBA”), when awarding government contracts, to favor 
businesses whose owners had “been subjected to racial or 
ethnic prejudice or cultural bias.”10  While, in Fisher, the 
Court explained the circumstances under which a university 
would be allowed to classify based on race in its admissions 
process, the court in Rothe bypassed that determination by 
deciding that the statute in question did not contain a racial 
classification. 
A. Rothe  
  
Rothe required the court to determine the 
constitutionality of 15 U.S.C. § 637(a),11  which authorizes 
the SBA to contract with federal agencies which can then 
subcontract to eligible small businesses.12  The statute 
provides that eligible businesses include those majority-
owned by “socially and economically disadvantaged” 
individuals.13  § 637(a)(5) defines a socially disadvantaged 
                                                 
6  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016). 
7  Id. at 2215. 
8 Id.  
9  Rothe Dev., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 57 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
10  Id. at 61. 
11  15 U.S.C. § 637. 
12  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5). 
13  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(B). 
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individual as someone “who has been subjected to racial or 
ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a 
member of a group without regard to their individual 
qualities.”14   
The plaintiff, Rothe, was a small computer-service 
business in Texas.15  It regularly bid on Defense Department 
contracts, including those specified by the statute.16  Rothe 
did not claim to be majority-owned by people who had 
experienced racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias.17  
Thus, it argued, it could not compete for government 
contracts on equal footing with businesses awarded the 
preference.18  It challenged the law19  as violating its equal 
protection rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment,20  contending that the statute contained an 
unconstitutional racial classification.21 
The district court granted the government’s motion 
for summary judgment, holding that the statute was 
constitutional.22  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, 
reasoning that the law contained no facially race-based 
classification.23  Therefore, the court declined to apply “strict 
scrutiny,” instead reviewing the law under the “rational 
basis” standard.24  As that analysis is significantly more 
deferential to Congress, § 637(a) easily passed muster.25 
                                                 
14  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5). 
15  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Rothe Dev. v. U.S. Dep’t. of 
Def., 836 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 16-1239).  
16  836 F.3d at 61. 
17  Id. at 62. 
18  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15. 
19  Because Rothe did not challenge the SBA regulations, which 
apply § 637 in a racially classificatory manner, the court limited its 
analysis to the specific language of the statute. Id. at 62. 
20  836 F.3d at 61. 
21  Id. 
22  Rothe Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 107 F. Supp. 3d 183, 213 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
23  836 F.3d at 63. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
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On October 16, 2017, the Supreme Court denied 
Rothe’s petition for certiorari.26  By declining to hear the 
case, the Court left unresolved questions concerning the 
possibilities stemming from the D.C. Circuit’s decision.  This 
Note will address some of those questions and situate the 
Rothe reasoning within the context of affirmative action 
jurisprudence. 
B. Important Terms 
 
Because some of the important terms in this Note 
appear in different contexts, clarification is necessary.  A 
decision, law, or plan containing a “racial classification” is 
one that explicitly identifies race as a factor for special 
treatment.27  Regardless of the purpose of the decision, law, 
or plan, if it requires different treatment of people due to 
their membership in a racial group, it has a facially race-
based classification.28  For example, separating prison 
inmates by race constitutes a system of racial classifications, 
even when purportedly undertaken to prevent violence.29 
A law or state action that is “race-neutral” is one that 
does not contain an explicit race-based classification.30  
Nevertheless, it might have a race-based effect, and, as this 
Note will discuss, may even be intended to achieve that 
effect.  
An action, law, or plan that is “race-conscious” is one 
where race is a motivating factor in the enactment process.31  
An action can be race-conscious whether or not it contains a 
                                                 
26  Rothe Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., No. 16-1239, 2017 WL 
1375832, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). 
27  See generally, Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) 
(explaining that racial distinctions constitute suspect classifications 
regardless of whether they burden all races equally). 
28  Id. at 499. 
29  Id. 
30  See generally Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: 
The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 653 (2015) (explaining that facially neutral laws do not explicitly 
categorize based on race). 
31  Id. 
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racial classification.  Thus, a law can be both race-neutral 
and race-conscious.32  Of course, a facially race-based 
classification will almost invariably be race-conscious.  
Race-consciousness is subjective to the decision-
maker.  Drawing school districts with the intent of giving 
black children a better chance of attending good public 
schools would be race-conscious, even if the plan did not 
explicitly require that black people be given treatment 
different from people of other races.33  A plan intended to 
make Latino/a people less likely to be selected for juries 
would be race-conscious,34  even if the plan were facially 
race-neutral.  But a plan resulting in fewer Latino/a people 
being selected for juries would not be race-conscious if the 
decision-maker did not consider race when enacting it.35 
Historically, courts addressing equal protection 
questions have begun by attempting to discern “illicit” 
classifications.36  Those categories typically include race.37  
When a court finds a proscribed classification, it will accord 
less deference to the decision-maker.  Racial classifications 
typically trigger “strict scrutiny.” In order for a law or 
decision to survive that analysis, it must be narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.38   
This Note argues that determining whether laws 
contain racial classifications should not be the chief concern 
in evaluating equal protection claims.  Part I describes two 
                                                 
32  Id. 
33  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
34  To the extent that equal protection jurisprudence conflates 
ethnic and racial characteristics. See, e.g., Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los 
Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as’ Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 69, 138 (1998) (arguing that, in a case involving exclusion 
of Latino people from juries, the Court has conflated ethnic neutrality with 
racial neutrality). 
35  See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991). 
36  Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” Racial 
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 563 (1975). 
37  See generally id. 
38  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
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interpretive methods of antidiscrimination law.  Part II 
provides some of the constitutional background of affirmative 
action and disparate impact.  Part III explains the holding in 
Rothe.  Part IV describes the implications of the Rothe 
reasoning for affirmative action and the interpretive 
methods.  
As cases like Rothe demonstrate, the distinction 
between race-neutral-but-race-conscious and facially 
classificatory laws is usually one of form and not substance.  
Applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action plans because 
they classify based on race is a misguided method of legal 
interpretation and loses its purported value when race-
neutral alternatives are neutral only in name.  This Note 
will attempt to show that the classification-oriented 
approach creates a legal conundrum; it results either in 
courts striking down benevolent plans designed to aid 
minority groups, or, in light of cases like Rothe, it forces 
legislatures to contort statutory language in order to skirt an 
antiquated interpretive method. 
II. INTERPRETIVE METHODS IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW: 
ANTICLASSIFICATION VS. ANTISUBORDINATION 
 
Since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
several interpretive perspectives have battled for control of 
equal protection law.  The two predominant theories are the 
Antisubordination principle and the Anticlassification 
principle.  The former refers to the idea that a law may not 
“‘aggravate’ or ‘perpetuate’ ‘the subordinate status of a 
specially disadvantaged group.’”39  Instead, laws should 
attempt to rectify the historically secondary position of 
oppressed minorities.40  Anticlassification, on the other hand, 
is the idea that a law may not classify people based on 
                                                 
39  Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights 
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 
10 (2003) (quoting Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 
5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976)). 
40  Id. at 9. 
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certain characteristics (e.g., race).41  Essentially, the 
government must avoid grouping people on the basis of 
forbidden categories, regardless of whether the impetus is 
invidious or benign.42   
Antisubordination and anticlassification frequently 
coincide.  A law requiring black people to attend segregated 
schools would violate both.43  On the one hand, it would 
expressly classify based on race and therefore run afoul of 
the anticlassification principle.  On the other, it would 
subjugate a historically disadvantaged minority group, thus 
violating the tenets of antisubordination. 
But as a practical matter, the concepts conflict in two 
scenarios.  The first point of tension exists when laws or 
policies that do not classify groups based on proscribed 
characteristics nonetheless disproportionately affect people 
belonging to disadvantaged minorities.  For example, a law 
prohibiting people living in a particular neighborhood from 
voting would be facially race-neutral.  But if that 
neighborhood happened to be predominantly black, the law 
would disparately impact black people.  Thus, the statute 
would not implicate the anticlassification principle, but it 
would run afoul of the doctrine of antisubordination.44   
The second discord occurs when laws or policies 
classify based on proscribed characteristics, but benefit 
                                                 
41  Id. at 10. 
42  Id. 
43  Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 746 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., arguing that the Court in Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) struck down a law requiring black 
children to attend segregated schools on anticlassification principles. 
“[T]he Court held that segregation deprived black children of equal 
educational opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and other 
tangible factors were equal, because the classification and separation 
themselves denoted inferiority,” with Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing, based on antisubordination ideals, that 
Brown promised racially integrated education and encouraged local 
authorities to undertake efforts to bring about that aim).  
44  But see Fiss, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. at 171 (arguing that the 
[anticlassification] principle could conceivably be construed to apply to 
disparate impact cases).  
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minority groups.  The most common form of this 
phenomenon is affirmative action.  Where a program awards 
a preference based on racial status, it violates the 
anticlassification principle.  The anticlassification theorist 
would disapprove of explicit affirmative action based on the 
theory that certain classifications are inherently harmful.45  
The issue, from that perspective, would concern means and 
not ends.  Justice Thomas discussed affirmative action from 
an anticlassificationist angle in his concurrence in Adarand 
Constructors Inc. v. Pena, where the Court struck down a 
statute awarding contracting preference to racial minorities; 
“That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by 
good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that 
under our Constitution, the government may not make 
distinctions on the basis of race.”46   
Proponents of antisubordination, conversely, would 
likely accept explicit affirmative action as presumptively 
valid.47  Laws and policies designed to benefit historically 
disadvantaged minorities would not raise concerns of 
aggravating subjugation or perpetuating perceived 
inferiority.  Dissenting in Adarand, Justice Stevens argued 
that “[t]here is no moral or constitutional equivalence 
between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste 
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial 
subordination.”48  Essentially, the concern under the Equal 
Protection Clause should be the motivation or effect of a law, 
not whether it names racial groups. 
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has applied a 
relatively anticlassification-oriented approach to equal 
                                                 
45  See Balkin supra note 39 at 11 (noting that if the Court 
interpreted Brown to invalidate segregation in light of the 
anticlassification principle, affirmative action would be presumptively 
unconstitutional). 
46  515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
47  See id. (contending that a paternalistic impetus should not 
exempt racial classifications from strict scrutiny). 
48  515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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protection law.49  Affirmative action plans have survived 
application of this doctrine, but under limited 
circumstances.50  Many of the explicit affirmative action 
decisions have turned on the availability of “race-neutral 
alternatives.”51  This inquiry requires a reviewing court to 
assess whether the positive result sought to be achieved 
through racial classification could be achieved through 
measures that do not refer explicitly to race.  For example, a 
race-neutral alternative to giving school admissions 
preferences to members of minority racial groups might be 
“drawing public school attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of the neighborhood” in 
order to maintain school integration.52 
While the Court has upheld laws and policies with 
facially race-based classifications as “last resorts” to 
achieving diversity,53  it has rejected them absent “serious, 
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives.”54  When the Court deems such options 
available, it is generally disinclined to accept even benign 
racial classifications.  As the Court noted in Fisher,  
Though “[n]arrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative” or “require a university to choose 
between maintaining a reputation for 
excellence [and] fulfilling a commitment to 
provide educational opportunities to members 
of all racial groups,” it does impose “on the 
university the ultimate burden of 
demonstrating” that “race-neutral 
                                                 
49  Balkin at 10. 
50  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
51  See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
52  Id. 
53  Id. at 790. 
54  Id. at 735 (Roberts, C.J., writing for the Court). 
No. 4:175]          NEUTRAL IN NAME 185 
alternatives” that are both “available” and 
“workable” “do not suffice.”55 
But determining whether a statute contains a racial 
classification is not always easy.  To begin with, “‘express 
racial classification’ is not a self-defining term.”56  Intuition 
might suggest that it refers to any law explicitly naming a 
racial group.  But courts have applied the anticlassification 
principle inconsistently, often relying on subjective 
impressions.57   
The decision in Rothe is the latest example of 
competing antidiscrimination law principles.  On one 
hand, the D.C. Circuit applied an anticlassificationist 
reading to the statute in question.  It determined that 
15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) lacked a racial classification on 
its face, and that the law therefore warranted 
relatively lenient scrutiny.  But in refusing to discern 
a classification, the majority implicitly relied on the 
antisubordination principle. 
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DISPARATE IMPACT IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
Before moving to the implications of the court’s 
holding in Rothe, review of the legal history of affirmative 
action is important.  Racial affirmative action is based on 
antisubordination reasoning.58  That is, it relies on racial 
parity not as a means but as an end.  Treating people 
differently based on race is an acceptable method of pursuing 
ultimate equality.  Frequently, this results in methods that 
are explicitly unequal.59  In that sense, antisubordination is 
a product of societal context.  In a world without a history of 
                                                 
55  Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339, 
and Fisher I, 570 U.S. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 2420). 
56  Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: 
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003). 
57  See Id. 
58  Balkin, supra note 39, at 11. 
59  See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701; 
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
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racial inequality, there might be no need for the 
antisubordination principle.  Without minority subjugation, 
there would be nothing from which to recover.  But in a 
society where racial inequality is not only mired in the past 
but a fact of the present, the antisubordination principle is 
an important premise on which to base remedial efforts.60 
A. Affirmative Action 
 
In the last thirty years, many industries have adopted 
affirmative action plans.  Legislatures have enacted laws 
with facially race-based classifications in order to benefit 
minority groups.61  Schools have used race in their 
admissions criteria.62   
One area where affirmative action has been 
particularly contentious is government contracting.  In the 
1989 case, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, the Supreme 
Court adopted a restrictive standard for affirmative action.63  
In rejecting the City of Richmond’s plan setting aside 30 
percent of public-works money for minority-owned 
businesses, the Court applied strict scrutiny to affirmative 
                                                 
60  The history of the Reconstruction Amendments supports an 
antisubordinationist view. To begin with, the drafters of the Equal 
Protection Clause were concerned primarily with protecting black people 
in their ability to exercise certain rights. See Michael J. Klarman, An 
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 216 
(1991). The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to proscribe 
racial classifications as such. Id. at 256. In fact, the Court did not create a 
presumption that racial classifications would be invalid under the Equal 
Protection Clause until it decided McLaughlin v. Florida in 1964 (379 U.S. 
184, 192 (1964)), almost a century after the Amendment passed. In light of 
that history, many have argued that racial classifications should not be 
suspect when they are enacted to remedy the subjugation of minority 
racial groups (See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) 
(Souter, J., dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791 (2008)). 
61  See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 448, (1980); 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. 
62  See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
63  488 U.S. at 511.  
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action.64  It ruled that a remedial plan targeting the effects of 
“past societal discrimination” did not amount to a compelling 
interest that could pass muster under strict scrutiny.65  
Instead, an affirmative action plan aimed at remedying 
discrimination would be valid only if the party defending the 
plan could demonstrate a “strong basis in evidence” that 
such remedial action was necessary.66  Such a showing 
required evidence of prima facie statutory or constitutional 
violations in the relevant industry and jurisdiction.67  This 
meant, essentially, that in order to create a facially race-
based affirmative action plan, an employer or legislature 
needed to identify systemic disparate treatment within the 
industry.68   
Seven years after J.A. Croson, the Court in Adarand 
affirmed the use of strict scrutiny review of facially race-
based affirmative action plans.69  The Court rooted its 
holding in a desire to maintain consistency.70  Assuming all 
racial classifications to be inherently suspect, the Court 
chose to apply a uniform standard to distinguish justifiable 
                                                 
64  Id. at 493. 
65  Id. at 505. 
66  Id. at 500. 
67  Id. 
68  This requirement differs from the necessary showing under 
Title VII. Unlike the constitutional requirement announced in J.A. Croson, 
to enact affirmative action measures in accordance with Title VII, an 
employer or legislature need show only a “manifest imbalance in a 
traditionally segregated job category.” United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-
CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979). The Court in Weber 
maintained that this disparity need not rise to the level of a prima facie 
statutory violation. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara 
County., Cal., the Court clarified that standard: 
In some cases, of course, the manifest imbalance may be 
sufficiently egregious to establish a prima facie case. 
However, as long as there is a manifest imbalance, an 
employer may adopt a plan even where the disparity is 
not so striking, without being required to introduce the 
nonstatistical evidence of past discrimination demanded 
by the “prima facie” standard. . . . 480 U.S. 616, n. 11 
(1987). 
69  515 U.S. at 201. 
70  Id. 
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classifications from invidious ones.71  The majority relied on 
the anticlassification principle, reasoning that expressly 
considering race is inherently dangerous and ought to 
require a compelling justification.  Rather than judging 
classifications as invidious or benign and then conducting 
the requisite analysis, the Court purportedly applied strict 
scrutiny in order to differentiate invidious from benign 
classifications.72 
Dissenting in Adarand, Justice Stevens argued that 
classificatory laws designed to harm minorities ought to 
receive a different analysis from those enacted to benefit 
protected groups.73  He explained that “a single standard 
that purports to equate remedial preferences with invidious 
discrimination cannot be defended in the name of ‘equal 
protection.’”74  In response to the majority’s claim that strict 
scrutiny should be used to make the initial distinction 
between invidious and benign, he compared the burden of 
discerning an illicit impetus to that of unearthing intentional 
discrimination in disparate impact cases.75  Distinguishing 
between invidious and benign classifications, he reasoned, 
would be no more difficult than differentiating between 
discriminatory and innocent motives, something the Court 
already did, without applying strict scrutiny, in its disparate 
impact line of cases.76   
While the majority in Adarand adopted the 
anticlassification principle, the dissent championed 
antisubordination.  Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
endorsed the idea that racial classifications are inherently 
harmful.77  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
                                                 
71  Id. at 228. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
74  Id. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
75  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 245-46 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
76  Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
77  Id. at 234. 
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worried about the effects of laws on racial minorities whether 
or not those statutes actually classified racial groups.78   
But by adopting the strict scrutiny standard for all 
laws or plans containing racial classifications, the Court in 
Adarand heightened the requirements for constitutionality 
in the context of race-based affirmative action.  Although the 
Court explained that application of strict scrutiny would not 
necessarily be fatal to a law or plan, the Court has since been 
reluctant to find racial classifications constitutional under 
that analysis.79   
B. Disparate Impact 
 
In 1976, the Court decided the seminal constitutional 
disparate impact case, Washington v. Davis.80  The plaintiffs 
in that case were black people in the District of Columbia 
applying to be police officers.  Their applications were 
rejected because they failed a written test.81  They sued to 
invalidate the test on the ground that it racially 
discriminated in violation of the Fifth Amendment.82   
The test was facially race-neutral.83  Nothing about it 
expressly burdened black people more heavily than people of 
other races.84  In determining that the test was 
constitutional, the Court created a standard for facially 
neutral programs.  The test would be invalid, it said, only if 
the plaintiffs could identify a racially discriminatory 
purpose.85  The Court qualified that standard by noting that 
a racially discriminatory purpose could be inferred from the 
disproportionate impact alone.86  But it ultimately concluded 
                                                 
78  Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
79  See, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A 
Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (2000). 
80  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
81  Id. at 233. 
82  Id. at 234. 
83  Id. at 235. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 240. 
86  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 241 (1976). 
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that its “cases [had] not embraced the proposition that a law 
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflect[ed] a 
racially discriminatory purpose, [would be] unconstitutional 
solely because it ha[d] a racially disproportionate impact.”87  
This particular test, the Court said, sought to ascertain 
whether applicants had acquired a particular level of verbal 
skill, not to disproportionately keep black people off of the 
police force.88  Thus, the Court established that a state-
imposed racial disparate impact, without more, was 
constitutional.   
The Court affirmed this standard three years later in 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.89  It 
held that a law or other official act having a disparate impact 
would not necessarily be unconstitutional even if the 
legislature were aware of the disproportionate effect.90  The 
Court thus declined to apply the proposition that “a person 
intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his 
voluntary actions.”91  In disparate impact cases under the 
Constitution, the Court ruled, a course of action would be 
invalid only if undertaken at least in part “because of, not 
merely in spite of” its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.92 
The Court in Feeney noted that a facially neutral law 
would not violate equal protection absent an “invidious” 
purpose.93  In that regard, a facially neutral law designed to 
harm a minority racial group would be suspect.  “[W]hen a 
neutral law has a disparate impact upon a group that has 
historically been the victim of discrimination, an 
unconstitutional purpose may still be at work.”94  This 
language implied that a facially neutral law intended to 
                                                 
87  Id. at 239 (emphasis added). 
88  Id. at 245. 
89  442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). 
90  Id. at 279. 
91  Id. 
92  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 279 (1976). 
93  Id. at 274. 
94  Id. 
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benefit a historically victimized group would be 
presumptively valid. 
The Court endorsed this theory in Texas Department 
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., where it recognized the existence of disparate 
impact claims under the Fair Housing Act.95  In that case, 
the Court noted that local housing authorities could “choose 
to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with race-
neutral tools.”96  The Court accepted that racial diversity 
could be at least part of the motive for a facially neutral 
policy without that policy triggering strict scrutiny.97  Thus, 
it validated the contrapositive to Feeney.  While the Court in 
Feeney held that a facially neutral law with an invidious 
purpose would be presumptively invalid, the Court in Texas 
Dept. of Housing explained that a similar law with a benign 
purpose would be presumptively valid, even if the disparate 
effects were intentional.98   
C. Race-Neutral Affirmative Action 
 
The Davis/Feeney test applies in the context of 
affirmative action.  In that setting, plans disproportionately 
benefitting minority racial groups are presumptively 
constitutional if they do not facially classify by race.99  The 
Court has referred to this sort of disparate-impact-
affirmative-action as “race-neutral means.”100  Within that 
category, a benign policy is presumptively constitutional if it 
is facially race-neutral, even if it is motivated at least in part 
by race-consciousness.101  A school or employer can, for 
instance, create an admissions plan or application designed 
in part to accept more people belonging to minority racial 
                                                 
95  135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
96  Id. at 2525. 
97  Id. 
98  E.g., a statute drawing school attendance zones in light of 
neighborhood demographics. Id. at 2525. 
99  See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
100  Id. at 790. 
101  Id. at 789. 
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groups, as long as the plan does not expressly classify based 
on race.102   
In fact, when a court applies strict scrutiny to an 
affirmative action plan that classifies based on race, one of 
the considerations at the “narrow tailoring” stage is whether 
the decision-maker considered race-neutral alternatives.103  
A recent example, which the Court alluded to in Fisher,104  is 
the Texas Legislature’s adoption of a “Top Ten Percent 
Plan.”105  After the Fifth Circuit struck down the University 
of Texas at Austin’s facially race-based admissions 
program,106  the Texas Legislature enacted a policy whereby 
the University would admit any student from the top ten 
percent of his or her high school class.107  Because many 
Texas high schools had predominantly black student bodies, 
the plan resulted in the acceptance of a higher number of 
black students than would otherwise have been admitted.108  
The Legislature did not deny that the plan was intended, at 
least in part, to have a racially-disparate effect.109  
Nevertheless, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny analysis 
to the Top Ten Percent Plan.110  Rather, the Court treated 
the plan as a “race-neutral holistic review.”111   
In that vein, the Court has suggested that “race-
neutral” methods can still be race-conscious without 
triggering strict scrutiny.  As one commenter notes, “The 
Court’s acceptance of the percent plan illustrates that 
government may act in race-conscious but facially neutral 
ways to promote equal opportunity, even where government 
                                                 
102  Id. 
103  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357. 
104  136 S. Ct. at 2213. 
105  Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803. 
106  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 242 (5th Cir. 
2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013). 
107  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). 
108  Id. 
109  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242. 
110  Abigail Noel Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 
2213 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II]. 
111  Id. 
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seeks to alter racial outcomes.”112  Justice Kennedy affirmed 
this idea in Parents Involved.113  Discussing hypothetical 
policies that would be race-neutral, he suggested that 
“[parties] are free to devise race-conscious measures to 
address [a lack of diversity] without . . . individual typing by 
race.”114   
In sum, affirmative action is not constitutionally 
suspect if attempted through race-neutral means.  But 
facially race-based classifications are inherently suspect.  A 
public university policy automatically accepting fifteen black 
applicants every year would trigger strict scrutiny.  
Admitting anyone from the state in the top ten percent of his 
or her high school class would not, even if the purpose were 
partly to promote racial diversity on campus. 
But in some cases, distinguishing facially neutral 
policies from those containing racial classifications is not so 
easy.  That determination was the issue in Rothe. 
IV. THE CASE: ROTHE V. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEFENSE 
 
A. The Opinion 
 
The plaintiff in Rothe challenged § 637(a) of the Small 
Business Act on the grounds that it contains a racial 
classification.  It argued that the definition of “socially and 
economically disadvantaged” explicitly allocates a preference 
to certain racial groups. 
Rothe was not the first time a party had challenged § 
637.  A different section, § 637(d), was the focus of Adarand 
more than 20 years before.115  The Supreme Court in 
                                                 
112  Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The 
Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 
653, 674 (2015). 
113  551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
114  Id. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
115  515 U.S. at 207. 
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Adarand deemed that section unconstitutional.116  But the 
provision the D.C. Circuit addressed in Rothe differs slightly.  
The primary distinction between (d), which the Supreme 
Court considered in Adarand, and (a) which the D.C. Circuit 
dealt with in Rothe, was the fact that (d) expressly relied on 
the presumption that certain minority group members were 
socially and economically disadvantaged;117  “The contractor 
shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, 
Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other 
minorities, or any other individual found to be 
disadvantaged.”118  Section (a), on the other hand, contains 
no such language; “Whatever Congress’s reasons for 
directing private businesses to use race-based criteria under 
[§] (d)’s subcontracting clause, Congress authorized more 
nuanced implementation by the agency under [§] (a).”119 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff in Rothe challenged § 
637(a) as creating a similar racial presumption, and thus, a 
similarly suspect classification.120  In ruling that the statute 
is facially neutral, the court followed several lines of 
reasoning. 
First, the court determined that § 637(a)(5) envisions 
an “individual-based approach” rather than one reliant on 
group characteristics.121  The court noted that the statute 
could encompass people who were not part of minority racial 
groups, who had nonetheless experienced discrimination 
based on race, culture, or ethnicity.122  Moreover, the statute 
would not necessarily apply to people of minority groups who 
had not individually experienced racial discrimination.123 
                                                 
116  Id. at 204. 
117  Id. at 207. 
118  15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)(ii) (2016). 
119  Rothe, 836 F.3d at 69. 
120  Id. at 61. 
121  Id. at 64. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
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The court distinguished the academic admissions 
policy in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,124  
where the University of California at Davis’ Medical School 
used a racial quota in its admissions process.125  In contrast, 
the Rothe court noted, § 637(a)(5) allows consideration of 
personal experience (e.g., subjection to racial prejudice) in 
gauging social disadvantage.126  Unlike Bakke, Rothe does 
not rely on race qua race, and therefore does not contain an 
express racial classification.127   
Next, the Rothe court addressed § 637(a) from a 
disparate impact perspective.128  The court did not deny that, 
when it enacted the statute, Congress was aware of the 
racial effect § 637(a) would have.129  But Judge Pillard, 
writing for the majority, noted that congressional 
anticipation of disproportionate racial effects, absent a 
discriminatory purpose, does not condemn a law to strict 
scrutiny.130  “Mere foreseeability of racially disparate impact, 
without invidious purpose, does not trigger strict 
constitutional scrutiny.”131   
In reaching that conclusion, the court applied the 
Davis/Feeney framework.132  Under Feeney, a facially neutral 
law triggers constitutional heightened scrutiny only if 
enacted “because of, not merely in spite of,” a discriminatory 
purpose.133  Addressing that point, the Rothe court adopted 
some of the reasoning from Texas Dept. of Housing and ruled 
that § 637(a) was not meant to discriminate invidiously, but 
to advance equal opportunity.134  Thus, even though the 
legislature may have intended § 637(a)’s disproportionate 
                                                 
124  Id. 
125  438 U.S. at 276. 
126  836 F.3d at 64. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 71-72. 
129  Id. at 71. 
130  Id. at 72. 
131  Id. 
132  Rothe Dev., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 71-72 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
133  442 U.S. at 279 (internal quotations omitted). 
134  836 F.3d at 72. 
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effect, that intent was not “discriminatory” in the sense the 
Court described in Feeney.135    
The Rothe court also cited Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Parents Involved.136  There, Justice Kennedy 
stressed that “[s]chool boards may pursue the goal of 
bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races 
through [race-neutral] means.”137  Justice Kennedy rejected 
the application of strict scrutiny to those cases.  He 
explained, “These mechanisms are race conscious but do not 
lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells 
each [person] he or she is to be defined by race, so it is 
unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be 
found permissible.”138 
Finally, the Rothe court addressed prior affirmative 
action decisions.139  It quoted Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in J.A. Croson, where he noted that a legislature can, 
for example, “adopt a preference for small businesses, or 
even for new businesses—which would make it easier for 
those previously excluded by discrimination to enter the 
field.”140  Differing effects along racial lines could be 
acceptable, the Rothe court determined, based on Scalia’s 
view that “[s]uch programs [could] well have racially 
disproportionate impact” and still be valid.141  The Rothe 
court also reiterated the controlling concurrence in Parents 
Involved, where Justice Kennedy pointed out several 
presumably valid race-neutral, yet disproportionately 
effective ways of pursuing diversity in education.142  Relying 
on the reasoning in those cases, the Rothe court determined 
                                                 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
138  Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
139  Rothe, 836 F.3d at 72. 
140  Id. (quoting J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 526). 
141  Id. (quoting J.A. Croson, at id.). 
142  Id. (citing Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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that § 637(a) constitutes a race-neutral alternative as 
envisioned by the Court in the affirmative action context.143 
B. The Dissent 
 
The dissenting judge in Rothe argued that § 637(a) 
contains an express racial classification.144  In reaching that 
conclusion, she relied in part on paragraph (a)(8); “All 
determinations made pursuant to paragraph (5) with respect 
to whether a group has been subjected to prejudice or bias 
shall be made by the Administrator after consultation with 
the Associate Administrator for Minority Small Business and 
Capital Ownership Development.”145  To the dissent, the use 
of the word “group” in this provision suggested a 
presumption based on race, thereby undermining the view 
that the challenged provision applies to individuals.146  If a 
group had been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or 
cultural bias, then its members were presumptively socially 
disadvantaged.147  It did not, as the majority claimed, provide 
for an individual inquiry into whether each applicant met 
the definition separately.  “The message is clear—groups 
suffer discrimination and therefore persons who are 
members of those groups are socially disadvantaged.”148 
To support that view, the dissent pointed to the 
congressional findings section of the statute, which note 
(A) that the opportunity for full participation 
in our free enterprise system by socially 
and economically disadvantaged persons is 
essential if we are to obtain social and 
                                                 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 74 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
145  Rothe Dev., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 76 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(8))). 
146  Id. (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
147  Id. at 76-77 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
148  Id. at 76 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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economic equality for such persons and 
improve the functioning of our national 
economy; 
(B) that many such persons are socially 
disadvantaged because of their 
identification as members of certain 
groups that have suffered the effects of 
discriminatory practices or similar 
invidious circumstances over which they 
have no control; [and] 
(C) that such groups include, but are not 
limited to, Black Americans, Hispanic 
Americans, Native Americans, Indian 
tribes, Asian Pacific Americans, Native 
Hawaiian Organizations, and other 
minorities . . . .149   
Thus, she argued, the statute creates a floor for participation 
in the § 637(a) program.150  It classifies by race, and then 
allows the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to select 
from within that class.151  “[I]f not rebutted, the SBA must 
presume members of [racial groups and other minorities] are 
socially disadvantaged.”152 
 The majority dismissed these concerns, arguing that 
the congressional findings were not dispositive.153   
There are many reasons Congress might have 
identified certain racial groups when 
announcing the policy behind the [§ 637(a)] 
program. Congress might have wanted to offer 
paradigmatic examples of the problem or to 
                                                 
149  Id. (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(1)(A) – (C) (footnote omitted))). 
150  Id. at 77 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
151  Rothe Dev., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 77 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
152  Id. at 78 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
153  Id. at 66. 
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send a signal of responsiveness to Americans 
of minority backgrounds, many of whom felt 
they lacked a fair shot at the American 
dream.154   
The court also rejected the idea that the findings 
section creates a presumption that racial minorities are 
socially disadvantaged.155  “Congress’s findings that 
individual business owners may have been unfairly subjected 
to race-based disadvantage do not . . . supplant the race-
neutral definition of social disadvantage found in section 
637(a)(5).”156 
 The case ultimately turned on whether § 637(a) does 
in fact presume that racial minorities are socially 
disadvantaged.  While the Court in Adarand held that § 
637(d) created such a presumption,157  the court in Rothe 
held that § 637(a) does not.158  Providing a benefit to a person 
who has experienced racial prejudice is acceptable; assuming 
that a member of a racial minority has experienced such 
prejudice by virtue of minority status is not.  
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ROTHE AND THE PROBLEMS WITH 
ANTICLASSIFICATION 
 
Regardless of whether the D.C. Circuit was correct in 
determining that § 637(a) does not contain a race-based 
presumption, Rothe expanded the possibilities of what counts 
as “race-neutral.” Whether Justice Kennedy envisioned a law 
like the one in Rothe at the time of Parents Involved, and 
whether he would have called § 637(a) “race-neutral” is 
unclear.  Regardless, following the Rothe holding, a 
classification can come very close to being a race-based 
preference without triggering strict scrutiny. 
                                                 
154  Id. 
155  Id. at 67. 
156  Id. at 66. 
157  515 U.S. at 203. 
158  836 F. 3d at 65. 
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So what does the Rothe holding say about affirmative 
action? On the one hand, if followed, it expands the 
possibilities for race-conscious decision-making in many 
areas.  From government contracting to college admissions, 
the sweep of the Rothe reasoning may be far-reaching.  On 
the other hand, the Rothe holding pushes the 
anticlassification principle to the limits of its usefulness.   
A. The Practical Implications of the Rothe 
Reasoning 
 
From a practical perspective, Rothe seems to create a 
space for affirmative action removed from strict scrutiny.  By 
allowing a policy that ventures so close to racial classification 
to slip through relatively unchallenged, the court in Rothe 
expanded the zone of what constitutes race-neutral means. 
Doctrinally, the Feeney/Davis standard is central to 
analyzing the D.C. Circuit’s holding.  Because laws and 
policies are exempt from strict scrutiny if their motive is 
benign and they do not expressly classify, facially neutral 
laws intended to benefit minorities are likely to receive 
rational basis review.  Since statutes facing that test will 
generally pass constitutional muster, Rothe’s restrictive view 
of what constitutes a classification is particularly important.  
Consider the possibilities; an agency using language 
similar to that in § 637(a)(5) could enact a law or plan 
favoring “people who have been discriminated against 
because of their identity as member[s] of a group without 
regard to their individual qualities.”159  In fact, several U.S. 
statutes have adopted the language from § 637(a) and 
applied the provision to other contracting agencies.160 
                                                 
159  15 U.S.C § 637(a)(5).  
160  See, e.g., 51 U.S.C. § 30304 (applying § 637(a)’s definition of 
“socially and economically disadvantaged individuals to National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration contracting); 42 U.S.C. § 4370d 
(applying the definition to Environmental Protection Agency 
subcontracts). 
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To be sure, without a presumption of eligibility, § 
637(a) is not necessarily the ideal method of furthering 
contracting opportunities for minority-owned businesses.  
Without a presumption that the statute applies to all 
members of specific racial groups, proving eligibility will 
likely require business owners to show that they have 
personally faced discrimination.  Depending on what proof is 
needed to make such a showing, that demonstration may be 
difficult, even for those who fit within the category.   
For example, people who have suffered the effects of 
implicit bias161  (maybe without realizing it) might not be 
able to provide proof of having faced racial discrimination in 
those cases.  Furthermore, people who have suffered the 
consequences of past segregation and discrimination, but 
cannot point to specific instances in their own lives, might 
not fit the definition in § 637(a)(5).  Although agencies 
implementing preferences like § 637(a) might attempt to 
define “discrimination” to include such nonspecific instances 
or the effects of implicit biases, proving that sort of general 
prejudice presents its own difficulties.   
For instance, people who have experienced the effects 
of disparate housing opportunities might not be able to prove 
that they “have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or 
cultural bias.” Even if subjection to inferior housing options 
fits an agency’s definition of “discrimination,” individuals 
might struggle to show that they have personally faced such 
circumstances.   
The Rothe court did not address the requisite proof 
demonstration under statutes like § 637(a).  In that regard, 
the holding leaves several important questions unanswered.  
For example, if a presumptive homeowner who is black is 
                                                 
161  Occurring when “[U]nconscious attitudes (including culturally 
learned associations or generalizations that we tend to think of as 
stereotypes) introduce unjustified assumptions about other people and 
related evidence that can distort a person’s judgment and behavior.” 
Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, First, Do No Harm: On 
Addressing The Problem of Implicit Bias in Juror Decision Making, 49 CT. 
REV. 190, 190 (2013). 
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shown houses in only minority neighborhoods, has she faced 
sufficient discrimination to fit the definition? Has someone 
whose parents were denied fair housing opportunities on 
account of race suffered racial prejudice by virtue of the 
difficulties involved in growing up in inferior housing? Has 
someone whose ancestor was a slave faced racial 
discrimination by virtue of that fact?  
To be sure, if the entity enacting the facially race-
neutral affirmative action plan is also the one implementing 
it,162  then a wider range of instances might be more likely to 
fit the definition.  But that is not always the case.  For 
example, a legislature might create a law like § 637(a)(5) and 
entitle third parties to determine whether applicants meet 
the “having faced discrimination” definition.  In that 
instance, the implementing agency might adopt a very 
specific and difficult proof standard, especially if the agency 
opposes the plan to begin with.     
Ultimately, the Court in Adarand suggested that a 
presumption of eligibility for people belonging to certain 
racial groups would be tantamount to a classification based 
on race.163  Thus, although a legislature can unequivocally 
say that a statute is intended to favor people of minority 
races, it cannot, without a sufficient justification under strict 
scrutiny, prefer those people by entitling them to a 
presumption of eligibility.  In Rothe, that meant that § 637(a) 
could create a disparate impact favoring people belonging to 
minority races and that the legislature could unambiguously 
espouse that effect as its purpose.  But it also meant that the 
more definitively the statute achieved the intended end (e.g., 
by presuming that the people it wanted to help were those 
entitled to participate in its aid program), the more suspect it 
would become.   
Nevertheless, benevolent racial classifications and 
statutes like § 637(a)(5) should yield different results only in 
                                                 
162  For example, a university adopting language like § 637(a)(5) 
in its own admissions policy and then deciding which applicants have 
faced racial prejudice. 
163  515 U.S. at 213. 
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marginal cases.  Moreover, as Justice Souter noted in his 
dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger, the inconsistent treatment of 
the two methods encourages legislatures and state decision-
makers to “hide the ball.”164  In Gratz, the Court applied 
strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan’s use of racial 
preferences in undergraduate admissions.165  Justice Souter 
argued in dissent that mere acknowledgment of race-
consciousness should not trigger increased suspicion.166 He 
explained that “it seems especially unfair to treat the candor 
of the admissions plan as an Achilles’ heel.”167  As Justice 
Souter recognized, if the methods are the problem, the 
incentive is to minimize transparency through coyly worded 
legislation, not avoid a particular result.  When courts are 
willing to tolerate facially neutral race-consciousness, this 
sentiment highlights the hypocrisy of anticlassification all 
the more. 
In sum, courts will allow legislatures to further 
benevolent race-conscious goals as long as they use facially 
race-neutral means.  But as soon as Congress, intending to 
favor people from historically subjugated racial groups, 
classifies those it intends to help, the laws become suspect.  
One implication seems inescapable; the anticlassification 
principle is the wrong way to further the goals of equal 
protection.   
B. Rothe’s Implications for the Anticlassification 
Principle 
 
Ultimately, the Rothe holding indicates the 
infeasibility of anticlassification as an interpretive method.  
The anticlassificationist argument against facially race-
based affirmative action relies on the belief that classifying 
people based on race is itself an evil prohibited by equal 
protection.  This was Justice Roberts’ concern in Parents 
Involved, where he argued that “[t]he way to stop 
                                                 
164  539 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
165  Id. at 270. 
166  Id. at 297. 
167  Id. 
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discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race.”168  From that perspective, the 
Reconstruction Amendments were intended only to prohibit 
racial distinctions (and those based on membership in other 
protected classes).  It is a “race-conservative” point of view.169 
Classifying people based on race is undoubtedly 
problematic in many instances.  When the Court decided 
Loving v. Virginia in 1967, it said that classification was 
harmful even if both white people and black people were 
labelled.170  But racial distinctions were not the most 
concerning issue for the Court.  What the Court truly cared 
about in Loving was the reason why the particular 
classification was harmful.  Classification, in the context of 
miscegenation, was wrong because of the way it subjugated 
black people.  It was wrong because it carried with it 
sentiments like, 
Almighty God created the races white, black, 
yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on 
separate continents.  And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would 
be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that 
he separated the races shows that he did not 
intend for the races to mix.171 
Of course, the anticlassificationist would argue that 
this is precisely the sort of problematic language at the heart 
of equal protection.  And in part, the anticlassificationist 
would be correct.  But also, she would overlook the deeper 
issue.  Pointing out alleged differences between the races 
was not the crux of the problem in Loving.  The real concern 
was the motive and rationale.  The belief that the races 
ought to be separate arose from ideas concerning inferiority 
and superiority.  The racial classification in Loving was 
                                                 
168  551 U.S. at 748. 
169  See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: 
An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 
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170  388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
171  Id. at 3. 
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suspect because it was designed to perpetuate a history of 
racism. 
Moreover, if § 637(a) is a “race-neutral” alternative, 
there doesn’t seem to be much use for the anticlassification 
principle.  By enacting § 637(a), Congress intentionally 
favored people because of race.  It may not have explicitly 
labelled those people, but it did not attempt to hide its 
motive.  If facially race-based classifications are inherently 
discriminatory (as seems to be Justice Roberts’ opinion in 
Parents Involved), the statute the D.C. Circuit addressed in 
Rothe does not seem much less discriminatory.   
What, then, does the Rothe holding ultimately mean 
for anticlassification? On one hand, Rothe is a test case for 
anticlassificationists.  It forces those who support the theory 
to consider the bounds of its usefulness.  When 
anticlassification extends only to the label and has little 
practical effect on the law, is it still a valuable interpretive 
method? If the legislature can act for race-based reasons 
without expressly classifying by race, then the only thing left 
to consider is whether the absence of a label is worth forcing 
Congress to hide the ball.   
But confusingly, the Court has suggested that when 
an agency successfully avoids classifying, it need not even 
bother to conceal its race-based motive.  A school is free to 
select students for race-conscious reasons as long as it does 
not use a racial label in its criteria.172  When a decision-
maker can act for the explicit purpose of achieving a race-
oriented outcome, it is difficult to see how only a racial label 
implicates equal protection, or, conversely, why a racial label 
automatically triggers strict scrutiny.  As Justice Ginsburg 
noted in her dissent in Gratz, “the Constitution, properly 
interpreted, permits government officials to respond openly 
to the continuing importance of race.  Among constitutionally 
permissible options, those that candidly disclose their 
consideration of race seem to me preferable to those that 
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conceal it.”173  In light of Justice Ginsburg’s point, if openly 
considering race is preferable to surreptitiously awarding 
racial preferences, why is the degree of openness so 
troubling? Where does candor cross the line from desirable to 
suspicious? 
But modern statutes rarely classify based on race in 
order to subjugate minority groups.  The days of state-
endorsed Jim Crow racism have given way to subtler 
methods.174  In the pre-Brown era, a law classifying based on 
race was likely to be the product of anti-minority sentiment.  
Now, after Brown, a law containing a racial classification 
will almost invariably be a method of aiding historically 
subjugated groups.  Racism is undoubtedly alive in the 
modern age, but in the political world it has, for the most 
part, been relegated to areas like implicit bias, disparate 
impact, and surreptitious action.     
This is the case because, to begin with, state actors 
are likely to be aware that actions overtly intended to harm 
racial minorities will be unconstitutional.175  If a legislature 
harbors such malign intent, it is likely to act without 
classifying at all.  Thus, even if distinguishing invidious from 
benign classifications was once a difficult task (because the 
former were prevalent), it is a much more straightforward 
inquiry now (as overt racism in law-making has, for the most 
part, given way to implicit forms).  In some instances the 
determination might be more difficult than in others,176  but, 
nevertheless, discerning invidious race-based intent is well 
within the province of the judiciary.177   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Some authors have proposed amending the equal 
protection inquiry to consider factors other than 
classifications.178  Some contend, for example, that courts 
should focus instead on whether laws or plans perpetuate a 
history of past discrimination or affect access to the political 
process.179  Under that approach, a law would not be 
constitutionally suspect merely because it contains a facially 
race-based classification.  Instead, a court would first 
determine whether the law perpetuates one of the social ills 
most often associated with minority subjugation.180 
This Note does not necessarily promote a particular 
alternative.  It suggests only that the absence of racial labels 
should not be as significant a factor in determining the 
constitutionality of laws, plans, or other state actions.  
Distinguishing classificatory laws from facially-neutral-but-
race-conscious ones creates a false dichotomy.  The two are 
essentially the same, and if the reasoning in Rothe takes 
hold, becoming more so.   
Reliance on the classification-oriented method of 
analysis is an antiquated form of legal interpretation.  It is 
relatively rare that plans and laws enacted for 
discriminatory purposes will explicitly subjugate racial 
groups.  These days, when a state actor expressly classifies 
by race, it is unlikely that the classification will be invidious. 
Ultimately, Rothe demonstrates that racial 
classifications are not the crux of the issue.  If a legislature 
wants to target a group, it can do so through facially neutral 
methods.  The relevant concern is effect.  The Court has 
recognized this in the disparate impact context as purposeful 
discrimination and has granted protection under the Fifth 
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and Fourteenth Amendments.181  According to disparate 
impact doctrine, there is little practical difference between 
an invidious discriminatory law that classifies based on race, 
and one that does not.  Courts are likely to find both 
unconstitutional. 
But there is currently a constitutional difference 
between a benign law that classifies based on race and one 
that does not.  This is where cases like Rothe are illustrative.  
Because race-consciousness can be as overt as that in Rothe, 
or the Top Ten Percent plan in Fisher, then why does it 
matter whether those racial concerns are manifest through 
classifications? Moreover, if classifications are so difficult to 
distinguish from facially neutral means, why are courts so 
focused on labels in the first place? If a facially neutral law 
intended to benefit minorities will not trigger strict scrutiny, 
so too should a benign racial classification with the same 
effect be free from such suspicion. 
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